《货币银行学》课程教学资源（文献资料）4.全球次贷危机七大问题

Q&AONASADLYPREDICTABLE全球次贷危机七大问题DEBTCRISISByMartinWolfTuesday,September11,2007我We们正在经历证券化金融市场这个新世界are living through the first crisis of our的首个危机。现在要出说此次动荡在经济上会何等重要，未免为时过早。但没人能brave newworld of securitised financial够质疑其对金融体系的意义。此次动荡的markets.Itistooearlyto tellhow源头在于美国本身的信贷扩张和金融创economically important this upheaval新。我们不能将其归于周边经济体的will prove.But nobodycandoubt its“裙带资本主义”（cronycapitalism)，反significanceforthefinancial system.Its倒应该归各于这个全球经济核心的不负originslie withcredit expansion and责任。financial innovation in the Us itself. Itcannotbeblamedon"cronycapitalism"inperipheral economies,butrather onirresponsibilityinthe coreof theworldeconomy.目前发生的情况提出了一些重要问题。以What has happened raises important下就是其中的7个。questions.Hereare seven.First, why did this crisis start in the US?The answer is:"The borrowing, stupid"Default on debt -actual and feared -首先，为何这场危机始于美国？答案是：always drives big financial crises“因为借贷，傻瓜”。债务违约（实际发生的和人们担心的）总是会引发重大金融because creditorsthinkthattheyoughtto be repaid.UShouseholds were the危机，因为债权人认为他们应该得到还world economy'smost important net款。2005年前后，美国家庭取代上世纪borrowers inthemid-2000s,replacing90年代的新兴市场，成为全球经济中最为重要的净借款人。theemergingmarketsofthe1990sSecond, what created the conditionsforthe crisis? It took foolish borrowers,第二，什么为此次危机创造了条件？是愚andfoolishinvestorsclever鑫的借款人、愚的投资者和聪明的中介intermediaries,whopersuadedthe机构。中介机构说服借款人借入他们无法former to borrow what they could not负担的债务，投资者投资于他们并不了解afford and the latter to invest in what的产品。事实上，即便是借款人可能也不they did not understand. In fact, even愚：如果一个人一无所有，那么他们投the borrowers might not have been机日益上涨的房地产，可能是一种相当合foolish:if one owns nothing,itmaybe理的行为，因为他们知道，个人破产总是sensiblequitetospeculateon一个解决办法。inthehousepricesever-risingknowledge that personal bankruptcy isalways a way out

Q&A ON A SADLY PREDICTABLE DEBT CRISIS By Martin WolfTuesday, September 11, 2007 We are living through the first crisis of our brave new world of securitised financial markets. It is too early to tell how economically important this upheaval will prove. But nobody can doubt its significance for the financial system. Its origins lie with credit expansion and financial innovation in the US itself. It cannot be blamed on “crony capitalism” in peripheral economies, but rather on irresponsibility in the core of the world economy. What has happened raises important questions. Here are seven. First, why did this crisis start in the US? The answer is: “The borrowing, stupid”. Default on debt – actual and feared – always drives big financial crises because creditors think that they ought to be repaid. US households were the world economy's most important net borrowers in the mid-2000s, replacing the emerging markets of the 1990s. Second, what created the conditions for the crisis? It took foolish borrowers, foolish investors and clever intermediaries, who persuaded the former to borrow what they could not afford and the latter to invest in what they did not understand. In fact, even the borrowers might not have been foolish: if one owns nothing, it may be quite sensible to speculate on ever-rising house prices in the knowledge that personal bankruptcy is always a way out. 全球次贷危机七大问题 我 们正在经历证券化金融市场这个新世界 的首个危机。现在要出说此次动荡在经济 上会何等重要，未免为时过早。但没人能 够质疑其对金融体系的意义。此次动荡的 源头在于美国本身的信贷扩张和金融创 新。我们不能将其归咎于周边经济体的 “裙带资本主义”(crony capitalism)，反 倒应该归咎于这个全球经济核心的不负 责任。 目前发生的情况提出了一些重要问题。以 下就是其中的 7 个。 首先，为何这场危机始于美国？答案是： “因为借贷，傻瓜”。债务违约（实际发 生的和人们担心的）总是会引发重大金融 危机，因为债权人认为他们应该得到还 款。2005 年前后，美国家庭取代上世纪 90 年代的新兴市场，成为全球经济中最为 重要的净借款人。 第二，什么为此次危机创造了条件？是愚 蠢的借款人、愚蠢的投资者和聪明的中介 机构。中介机构说服借款人借入他们无法 负担的债务，投资者投资于他们并不了解 的产品。事实上，即便是借款人可能也不 愚蠢：如果一个人一无所有，那么他们投 机日益上涨的房地产，可能是一种相当合 理的行为，因为他们知道，个人破产总是 一个解决办法

Third,whydid thiscrisis escalate?第三，为何此次危机会愈演愈烈？和以往一样，答案就是“传染效应”。美联储(Fed)"Contagion"is,as always,the answer.主席本·伯南克(BenBernanke)上周末在BenBernanke,chairmanoftheFederalReserve,describedtheprocess inhis杰克逊霍尔会议的讲话中描述了这一过程。speechattheJacksonHoleconferencelastweekend"Although this episode appears to havebeen triggered largely by heightened“尽管此次事件似乎主要是由次级抵concerns about subprime mortgages,押贷款领域担忧加剧的引发，但全球的金globalfinanciallosseshavefar融损失已经远远超出对这些贷款哪怕是exceeded even the most pessimistic最为悲观的预测。在一定程度上，这些更projections of credit losses on those广泛的损失可能反映出这样一种担忧：美loans.Inpart,thesewiderlosseslikely国房地产市场疲弱将抑制整体经济增长。reflect concerns that weakness in Us但其它因素也发挥了作用。”housing will restrain overall economicgrowth. But other factors are also atwork.“投资者的不确定性已明显增加，因为"Investor uncertainty/hasincreased对于缺乏透明度或回报结构复杂的结构thedifficultysignificantly,asof性产品，要评估其风险变得愈加困难。此risksofevaluatingthestructured外，正如在多次面临金融压力时一样，杠products that can be opaque or have杆参与者可能被迫出售资产和风险资本complexpay-offshas become more成本上升方面的不确定性，似乎已让投资evident. Also, as in many episodes of者不愿利用潜在的买进机会。”financialstress,uncertaintyaboutpossibleforcedsalesbyleveragedparticipants and a higher cost of riskcapital seem to have made investorshesitant to take advantage of possiblebuying opportunities."*第四，此次危机的影响可能有多严Fourth, how bad might the impact重？由于美国人是以本币举债，美国当局become? Since Americans borrow in似乎可以凭自已的意愿放松货币和财政their own currency, the Us authorities政策。不过，全球经济增速显著放缓的可can, it seems, loosen monetary and能性并非不存在。一个原因是，即便是美fiscal policy at will. Nevertheless, a国也不能冒失去债权人信心的风险。另-significantglobalslowdownisnot个原因是，风险溢价可能全面上升，许多impossible.Onereasonisthateventhe国家的经济活动将受到负面影响。不过，Uscannot risk losing the confidenceof还有一个原因是，银行可能缺乏取代暂时itscreditors.Anotheristhatrisk性收紧的非银行信贷的资金。此外，如果premiums are likelyto rise acrosstheboard, with adverse consequences foreconomicactivityinmanycountries.Yet

Third, why did this crisis escalate? “Contagion” is, as always, the answer. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, described the process in his speech at the Jackson Hole conference last weekend. “Although this episode appears to have been triggered largely by heightened concerns about subprime mortgages, global financial losses have far exceeded even the most pessimistic projections of credit losses on those loans. In part, these wider losses likely reflect concerns that weakness in US housing will restrain overall economic growth. But other factors are also at work. “Investor uncertainty has increased significantly, as the difficulty of evaluating the risks of structured products that can be opaque or have complex pay-offs has become more evident. Also, as in many episodes of financial stress, uncertainty about possible forced sales by leveraged participants and a higher cost of risk capital seem to have made investors hesitant to take advantage of possible buying opportunities.”* Fourth, how bad might the impact become? Since Americans borrow in their own currency, the US authorities can, it seems, loosen monetary and fiscal policy at will. Nevertheless, a significant global slowdown is not impossible. One reason is that even the US cannot risk losing the confidence of its creditors. Another is that risk premiums are likely to rise across the board, with adverse consequences for economic activity in many countries. Yet 第三，为何此次危机会愈演愈烈？和以往 一样，答案就是“传染效应”。美联储(Fed) 主席本•伯南克(Ben Bernanke)上周末在 杰克逊霍尔会议的讲话中描述了这一过 程。 “尽管此次事件似乎主要是由次级抵 押贷款领域担忧加剧的引发，但全球的金 融损失已经远远超出对这些贷款哪怕是 最为悲观的预测。在一定程度上，这些更 广泛的损失可能反映出这样一种担忧：美 国房地产市场疲弱将抑制整体经济增长。 但其它因素也发挥了作用。” “投资者的不确定性已明显增加，因为 对于缺乏透明度或回报结构复杂的结构 性产品，要评估其风险变得愈加困难。此 外，正如在多次面临金融压力时一样，杠 杆参与者可能被迫出售资产和风险资本 成本上升方面的不确定性，似乎已让投资 者不愿利用潜在的买进机会。” 第四，此次危机的影响可能有多严 重？由于美国人是以本币举债，美国当局 似乎可以凭自己的意愿放松货币和财政 政策。不过，全球经济增速显著放缓的可 能性并非不存在。一个原因是，即便是美 国也不能冒失去债权人信心的风险。另一 个原因是，风险溢价可能全面上升，许多 国家的经济活动将受到负面影响。不过， 还有一个原因是，银行可能缺乏取代暂时 性收紧的非银行信贷的资金。此外，如果

another is that banks maylack the美国家庭紧缩开支，看不出来谁会成capital to replace a temporary shrinkage为全球“最后的借款人”。最后，巨额损innon-bank credit.It isnotobvious,in失还可能在其它地方出现，特别是其它国addition,who would act as the world's"borrower of last resort",should us家估值过高的房地产市场。households retrench.Finally,big lossesmayyetemergeelsewhere,not least inother countries' overvalued housingmarkets.Fifth, how should central banks respond?第五，各国央行应该如何应对？央行They have two classic functions:to有两个典型的职能：一是通过避免通胀和ensure stability in the economy,by通缩，确保经济的稳定；二是向缺之流动avoiding both inflation and deflation,and性的金融体系提供流动性。to provide liquidityto an illiquid financialsystem.Thechallengeonthefirstmandateisnot第一项任务的挑战是不要过度反应，to overreact in anticipation of what may期待着经济也许不过是出现适度的暂时beonlyamodest blipto theeconomy.停顿。美国的联邦基金利率本月几乎肯定The federal fundsratewill almost会下调。不过，下调利率的原因并不明显。certainly be cut this month. It is not毕竟，通胀仍然是一个风险。obviousthat it should beslashed,however.Inflation remains arisk,afterall.The challenge on the second mandate is第二项任务的挑战是给保持金融系统to define what keeping the financial“流动”下定义。传统的定义是向受到挤system"liquid"means.Theclassic兑威胁的健康银行提供货币一一最终的definition is to provide moneythe价值储藏和支付手段。然而，证券化市场ultimate store of value and means of上一个可能的定义是：充当最终购买人，payment - to sound banks threatened以此始终保障市场上的流动性。出于我上bya run.A possible definitionin周探究过的理由，后一种定义是一种危险securitised markets,however,is to act的背离。as buyer of last resort,therebyguaranteeing liquidity in markets at alltimes.For thereasons Iexplored lastweek(thispage,August282007),thelatterwouldbeadangerousdepartureoutside investors.Thetheory wasthatriskwouldthusbeshiftedontothosebestabletobear it.Thepractice seemsto have been that it was shifted on tothose least able to understand it

another is that banks may lack the capital to replace a temporary shrinkage in non-bank credit. It is not obvious, in addition, who would act as the world's “borrower of last resort”, should US households retrench. Finally, big losses may yet emerge elsewhere, not least in other countries' overvalued housing markets. Fifth, how should central banks respond? They have two classic functions: to ensure stability in the economy, by avoiding both inflation and deflation; and to provide liquidity to an illiquid financial system. The challenge on the first mandate is not to overreact in anticipation of what may be only a modest blip to the economy. The federal funds rate will almost certainly be cut this month. It is not obvious that it should be slashed, however. Inflation remains a risk, after all. The challenge on the second mandate is to define what keeping the financial system “liquid” means. The classic definition is to provide money – the ultimate store of value and means of payment – to sound banks threatened by a run. A possible definition in securitised markets, however, is to act as buyer of last resort, thereby guaranteeing liquidity in markets at all times. For the reasons I explored last week (this page, August 28 2007), the latter would be a dangerous departure. outside investors. The theory was that risk would thus be shifted on to those best able to bear it. The practice seems to have been that it was shifted on to those least able to understand it. 美国家庭紧缩开支，看不出来谁会成 为全球“最后的借款人”。最后，巨额损 失还可能在其它地方出现，特别是其它国 家估值过高的房地产市场。 第五，各国央行应该如何应对？央行 有两个典型的职能：一是通过避免通胀和 通缩，确保经济的稳定；二是向缺乏流动 性的金融体系提供流动性。 第一项任务的挑战是不要过度反应， 期待着经济也许不过是出现适度的暂时 停顿。美国的联邦基金利率本月几乎肯定 会下调。不过，下调利率的原因并不明显。 毕竟，通胀仍然是一个风险。 第二项任务的挑战是给保持金融系统 “流动”下定义。传统的定义是向受到挤 兑威胁的健康银行提供货币——最终的 价值储藏和支付手段。然而，证券化市场 上一个可能的定义是：充当最终购买人， 以此始终保障市场上的流动性。出于我上 周探究过的理由，后一种定义是一种危险 的背离

Sixth,whatisthefutureof第六，证券化借贷的未来如何？对于将资产从资本较少的银行的资产负债表securitised lending?Good reasons can上剥离给资金更为充足的外部投资者，人still be advanced for shifting exposurefromthebalancesofthinlysheets们仍然可以提出很好的理由。这种做法背capitalised banks to thoseofbetter后的理论是，风险因而可以转移给那些最capitalized有承担能力的人。实际上，风险似乎转移给了那些最不了解它的人。The supply of such fools has, if only这种傻瓜投资者的供给已经（如果说temporarily, dried up. In the short run,仅仅是暂时的）枯竭。从短期看，随着现securitiseddebtis likelyto contract,as有债务被偿还或被注销，证券化债务有可existingdebt ispaiddownorwrittenoff.能萎缩。从长期看，金融中介机构将不得In the longer term,intermediaries will不设法提高其产品对买家的透明度。不幸have to find a way to make their的是，曾经发挥这一作用的评级机构已经productsmoretransparenttothebuyers.失去了信誉。Unfortunately,theratingsagencies,which once served this purpose, havelost their credibility第七，这场动荡对未来的监管意味着Seventh,what does this event implyfor什么？区分两个目标颇为重要。第一是保thefutureof regulation?It is importantto护无辜的人。购买了债务产品的投资者不distinguish two objectives. One is to属于此类。如果说不是傻瓜，他们就是自protect innocents.The investors who愿的投机者。政府应当努力保护这些金融bought the products do not fall in this机构免受自已蠢行的冲击，其中的理由并category. They were, if not fools, willing不充分。然而，那些借钱买房子的人可以speculators. It is not at all obvious why被视为无辜的人。the state should try to protect suchinstitutions fromtheirownfolly.Thosewhoborrowedthemoneytobuyhousesmay,however,be deemed innocents这是否适用于那些申请贷款时夸大收Whether this appliestopeoplewho入的人，目前还需要讨论。但家长主义者exaggerated their earnings in applying可能会要求设定最低首付或者废除“诱惑for loans is an open question. But性”低利率（“teaser”interestrates)），paternalists may requireminimum down以及其它鼓励普通老百姓借入超过其承payments or theabolition of “teaser"受能力的贷款的工具。interest ratesand other devices thatencouraged ordinary people to borrowmore than they could afford.第二个监管目标是保护金融市场免受最近几周这种恐慌的冲击。实现这一目标的Thesecondobjectiveofregulationis唯一方法或许是重新实行全面监管。to insulate financial markets against thesortofpanicseen inrecentweeks.Theonlywaytodothatmaybetore-regulatethemcomprehensively.Restrictions

Sixth, what is the future of securitised lending? Good reasons can still be advanced for shifting exposure from the balance sheets of thinly capitalised banks to those of better capitalized The supply of such fools has, if only temporarily, dried up. In the short run, securitised debt is likely to contract, as existing debt is paid down or written off. In the longer term, intermediaries will have to find a way to make their products more transparent to the buyers. Unfortunately, the ratings agencies, which once served this purpose, have lost their credibility. Seventh, what does this event imply for the future of regulation? It is important to distinguish two objectives. One is to protect innocents. The investors who bought the products do not fall in this category. They were, if not fools, willing speculators. It is not at all obvious why the state should try to protect such institutions from their own folly. Those who borrowed the money to buy houses may, however, be deemed innocents. Whether this applies to people who exaggerated their earnings in applying for loans is an open question. But paternalists may require minimum down payments or the abolition of “teaser” interest rates and other devices that encouraged ordinary people to borrow more than they could afford. The second objective of regulation is to insulate financial markets against the sort of panic seen in recent weeks. The only way to do that may be to re-regulate them comprehensively. Restrictions 第六，证券化借贷的未来如何？对于 将资产从资本较少的银行的资产负债表 上剥离给资金更为充足的外部投资者，人 们仍然可以提出很好的理由。这种做法背 后的理论是，风险因而可以转移给那些最 有承担能力的人。实际上，风险似乎转移 给了那些最不了解它的人。 这种傻瓜投资者的供给已经（如果说 仅仅是暂时的）枯竭。从短期看，随着现 有债务被偿还或被注销，证券化债务有可 能萎缩。从长期看，金融中介机构将不得 不设法提高其产品对买家的透明度。不幸 的是，曾经发挥这一作用的评级机构已经 失去了信誉。 第七，这场动荡对未来的监管意味着 什么？区分两个目标颇为重要。第一是保 护无辜的人。购买了债务产品的投资者不 属于此类。如果说不是傻瓜，他们就是自 愿的投机者。政府应当努力保护这些金融 机构免受自己蠢行的冲击，其中的理由并 不充分。然而，那些借钱买房子的人可以 被视为无辜的人。 这是否适用于那些申请贷款时夸大收 入的人，目前还需要讨论。但家长主义者 可能会要求设定最低首付或者废除“诱惑 性”低利率(“teaser” interest rates)， 以及其它鼓励普通老百姓借入超过其承 受能力的贷款的工具。 第二个监管目标是保护金融市场免受最 近几周这种恐慌的冲击。实现这一目标的 唯一方法或许是重新实行全面监管

wouldhavetobeimposedonproducts监管机构应当对已出售产品或金融机sold or on the ability of guaranteed构从事资产负债表表外交易的能力实行限制。financial institutions to engagein我认为，两种方法都无法发挥作用。off-balance-sheettransactions.Icannotseehoweitherwouldnowbemadeto对金融体系进行细节监管，这或许很困work.Regulation of the detail of the难，或是根本就不可能。这就是金融机构financial systemmayfall somewhere永远不能过分扩大规模，否则就可能倒闭的原因。betweenhardand impossible.Itiswhyfinancial institutions must never be toobig to fail.Financial crises are always different in金融危机永远是细节不同，本质却相detail and the same in their essence同。这次也不例外。它显示了一种常规模Thisoneis no exception.It showedthe式，即资产价格上升、信贷扩张、投机、normal pattern of rising prices ofassets,过剩，然后资产价格下降、违约、最终市expandingcredit,speculation,excess,场出现恐慌。新证券化金融市场正面临then falling prices, default and finally场考验。我们很快就会知道，它们能在多panic. The new securitised financial大程度上度过这场危机。marketsaremeetingatest.Wewill soonknow how far they manage to pass it.*Housing,HousingFinanceandMonetaryPolicy,www.federalreserve.gov

would have to be imposed on products sold or on the ability of guaranteed financial institutions to engage in off-balance-sheet transactions. I cannot see how either would now be made to work. Regulation of the detail of the financial system may fall somewhere between hard and impossible. It is why financial institutions must never be too big to fail. Financial crises are always different in detail and the same in their essence. This one is no exception. It showed the normal pattern of rising prices of assets, expanding credit, speculation, excess, then falling prices, default and finally panic. The new securitised financial markets are meeting a test. We will soon know how far they manage to pass it. 监管机构应当对已出售产品或金融机 构从事资产负债表表外交易的能力实行 限制。 我认为，两种方法都无法发挥作用。 对金融体系进行细节监管，这或许很困 难，或是根本就不可能。这就是金融机构 永远不能过分扩大规模，否则就可能倒闭 的原因。 金融危机永远是细节不同，本质却相 同。这次也不例外。它显示了一种常规模 式，即资产价格上升、信贷扩张、投机、 过剩，然后资产价格下降、违约、最终市 场出现恐慌。新证券化金融市场正面临一 场考验。我们很快就会知道，它们能在多 大程度上度过这场危机。 *Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, www.federalreserve.gov