复旦大学：《西方社会思想史》PPT教学课件_12 Phenomenological Sociology

Phenomenological sociology

Phenomenological Sociology

Content Schutz's Phenomenological Sociology Peter Berger and Luckmann: Sociology of Knowledge in Phenomenological Perspective Bourdieu on Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology Garfinkel: Ethnomethodology

Content • Schutz’s Phenomenological Sociology • Peter Berger and Luckmann: Sociology of Knowledge in Phenomenological Perspective • Bourdieu on Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology • Garfinkel: Ethnomethodology

Schutz: meaningful structure of the world of daily life Schutz's intellectual life was a concern for the meaningful structure of the world of daily life, the everyday working world into which each of us is born within whose limits our existence unfolds and which in its massive complexity, to outline and explore its essential features and to trace out its manifold relationships were the composite parts of his central task, the realization of a philosophy of mundane reality, or in more formal anguage, of a phenomenology of the natural attitude The understanding of the he paramount reality of common sense life is the clue to the understanding of the work of Schute

Schutz: meaningful structure of the world of daily life Schutz’s intellectual life was a concern for the meaningful structure of the world of daily life, the everyday working world into which each of us is born, within whose limits our existence unfolds, and which in its massive complexity, to outline and explore its essential features, and to trace out its manifold relationships were the composite parts of his central task, the realization of a philosophy of mundane reality, or in more formal language, of a phenomenology of the natural attitude. The understanding of the paramount reality of common￾sense life is the clue to the understanding of the work of Schute

Intersubjectivity The study of intersubjectivity seeks to answer questions such as these: how do we know other minds? Other selves? How is reciprocity of perspectives possible? How is mutual understanding and communication possible Intersubjectivity exists in the "vivid present in which we speak and listen to each other. We share the same time and space with others This simultaneity is the essence of intersubjectivity, for it means that i grasp the subjectivity of the alter ego at the same time as I li in my own stream of consciousness. and this grasp in simultaneity of the other as well as his reciprocal grasp of me makes possibleour being in the world together. Though both focused on subjectivity, phenomenological philosophers within the realm of consciousness and Schutz in the social world

Intersubjectivity • The study of intersubjectivity seeks to answer questions such as these: How do we know other minds? Other selves? How is reciprocity of perspectives possible? How is mutual understanding and communication possible • Intersubjectivity exists in the “vivid present” in which we speak and listen to each other. We share the same time and space with others. “This simultaneity is the essence of intersubjectivity, for it means that I grasp the subjectivity of the alter ego at the same time as I live in my own stream of consciousness. And this grasp in simultaneity of the other as well as his reciprocal grasp of me makes possible our being in the world together. • Though both focused on subjectivity, phenomenological philosophers within the realm of consciousness and Schutz in the social world

The common-sense world The common- sense world,”“ world of daily life,y“ every day world everyday working world ,"mundane reality are variant expressions for the intersubjective world experienced by man within what Husserl terms the natural attitude,, The common-sense world is the arena of social action; within it men come into relationship with each other and try to come to terms with each other as well as with themselves. All of this. however. is typically taken for granted, and this means that these structures of daily life are not themselves recognized or appreciated formally by common sense. Rather common-sense sees the e world, acts in the world. an interprets the world through these implicit typifications

The common-sense world • “The common-sense world,” “world of daily life,” “ every￾day world ”,”everyday working world”, “ mundane reality” are variant expressions for the intersubjective world experienced by man within what Husserl terms the “natural attitude”. The common-sense world is the arena of social action; within it men come into relationship with each other and try to come to terms with each other as well as with themselves. All of this, however, is typically taken for granted, and this means that these structures of daily life are not themselves recognized or appreciated formally by common sense. Rather, common-sense sees the world, acts in the world, and interprets the world through these implicit typifications

Biographical situation Common-sense world is given to us all in historical and cultural forms of universal validity but the way in which these forms are translated in an individual life depends on the totality of the experience a person builds up in the course of his concrete existence. The actor's actual situation has its history; it is the sedimentation of all his previous subjective experiences. They are not experienced by the actor as being anonymous but as unique and subjectively given to him and to him alone. The example of stranger

Biographical situation • Common-sense world is given to us all in historical and cultural forms of universal validity, but the way in which these forms are translated in an individual life depends on the totality of the experience a person builds up in the course of his concrete existence. The actor’s actual situation has its history; it is the sedimentation of all his previous subjective experiences. They are not experienced by the actor as being anonymous but as unique and subjectively given to him and to him alone. • The example of stranger

Stock of Knowledge at Hand At any moment in his life the individual has a stock of knowledge at hand. This stock is made up of typifications of the common-sense world This"stockpiling of typifications is endemic to common sense life. From childhood on the individual continues to amass a vast number of"recipes which then serve as techniques for understanding or at least controlling aspects of his experience Finally, the typifications which comprise the stock of knowledge are generated out of a social structure. here as everywhere knowledge is socially rooted, socially distributed and socially informed. Yet its individual expression depends on the unique placement of the individual in the social world

Stock of Knowledge at Hand • At any moment in his life the individual has a stock of knowledge at hand. This stock is made up of typifications of the common-sense world. • This “stockpiling” of typifications is endemic to common￾sense life. From childhood on, the individual continues to amass a vast number of “recipes” which then serve as techniques for understanding or at least controlling aspects of his experience. • Finally, the typifications which comprise the stock of knowledge are generated out of a social structure. Here as everywhere, knowledge is socially rooted, socially distributed, and socially informed. Yet its individual expression depends on the unique placement of the individual in the social world

Action as the starting point for a methodology of the social sciences Schutz stressed upon action as the starting point for a methodology of the social sciences. It is an insistence on the qualitative difference between the kinds of reality investigated by natural scientists and social scientists.It is a plea for appreciating the fact that men are not only elements of the scientist' s field of observation but preinterpreters of their own field of action, that their overt conduct is only a fragment of their total behavior that the first challenge given to those who seek to understand social reality is to comprehend the subjectivity of the actor by grasping the meaning an act has for him the axis of the social world

Action as the starting point for a methodology of the social sciences • Schutz stressed upon action as the starting point for a methodology of the social sciences. It is an insistence on the qualitative difference between the kinds of reality investigated by natural scientists and social scientists. It is a plea for appreciating the fact that men are not only elements of the scientist’s field of observation but preinterpreters of their own field of action, that their overt conduct is only a fragment of their total behavior, that the first challenge given to those who seek to understand social reality is to comprehend the subjectivity of the actor by grasping the meaning an act has for him, the axis of the social world

Knowledge and construct All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities ofour mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon This does not mean that, in daily life or in science we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science

Knowledge and construct • All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon. This does not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science

The constructs of the natural science It is up to the natural scientists to determine which sector of the universe of nature which facts and events therein, and which aspects of such facts and events are topically and interpretationally relevant to their specific purpose. These facts and events are neither preselected nor reinterpreted; they do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures. Relevance is not inherent in nature as such. it is the result of the selective and interpretative activity of man within nature or observing nature. The facts, data and events with which the natural scientist has to deal are just facts, data and events within his observational field but this field does not mean" anything to the molecules. atoms. and electrons therein

The constructs of the natural science • It is up to the natural scientists to determine which sector of the universe of nature, which facts and events therein, and which aspects of such facts and events are topically and interpretationally relevant to their specific purpose. These facts and events are neither preselected nor preinterpreted; they do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures. Relevance is not inherent in nature as such, it is the result of the selective and interpretative activity of man within nature or observing nature. The facts, data, and events with which the natural scientist has to deal are just facts, data, and events within his observational field but this field does not “mean” anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons therein