《货币银行学》课程教学资源（PPT课件，英文）Chapter 09 Regulating the Financial System

Chapter 9Regulating theFinancialSystemCopyright 2006byTheMcGraw-Hill Companies,Inc.All rights reservedMcGraw-Hilrwin

McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 9 Regulating the Financial System

CONTENSO9.1Recent InternationalEvidenceofBankCrises9.2 SourcesandConsequencesofRuns,Panics,andCrises9.3GovernmentSafetyNet9.4Regulationand Supervisionofthe Financial System14-2

14-2 CONTENS 9.1 Recent International Evidence of Bank Crises 9.2 Sources and Consequences of Runs, Panics, and Crises 9.3 Government Safety Net 9.4 Regulation and Supervision of the Financial System

Table14.1Worst Banking Crises since 1980Estimated Cost of ResolutionCountryCrisisDates(as%ofGDP)Argentina"55%1980-1982Indonesia55%1997-199847%China1990sJamaica199444%Chile'42%1981-1983Thailand199735%Macedonia1993-199432%Israel30%1977-1983Turkey*200030%Uruguay1981-198429%Korea199828%25%Cote d'lvoire1988-199124%Japan1990sUruguay24%1981-198420%Malaysia1997-1998

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9.1 Recent InternationalOEvidenceof BankCrisesFigure14.1Relationship between Size of a Financial Crisis and Change inGDPGrowth1510Ghana1982-89Norway51990-93Mexico1994-2000OBulgaria1996-97ArgentinaJamaica1980-821996-2000-5FinlandMalaysia1991-941997-2001Indonesia-101997-2002Uruguay1981-84-15O301020405060FiscalCostasPercentageofGDP(%)

14-4 9.1 Recent International Evidence of Bank Crises

9.2TheSourcesand ConseguencesOofRuns,Panics,andCrises1.Insolvent清偿力不足2.BankRun银行挤兑3.Illiquid流动性不足4.Bankpanic银行恐慌14-5

14-5 9.2 The Sources and Consequences of Runs, Panics, and Crises • 1. Insolvent 清偿力不足 • 2.Bank Run 银行挤兑 • 3. Illiquid 流动性不足 • 4. Bank panic 银行恐慌

9.3The Government Safety NetO1. three targets(1) to protect investors.(2) to protect bank customers frommonopolistic exploitation(3) to ensure the stability of the financialsystem14-6

14-6 9.3 The Government Safety Net • 1. three targets: • (1) to protect investors. • (2) to protect bank customers from monopolistic exploitation. • (3) to ensure the stability of the financial system

TheGovernmentSafetyNeta2. the lender of last resortan institution would be capable of makingloans to prevent the failure of solvent banks.and could provide liguidity in sufficientquantities to prevent or end a financial panic3.depositinsurancea depositor will receive the full accountbalance up to some maximum amount, even ifa bank fails14-7

14-7 The Government Safety Net • 2. the lender of last resort • an institution would be capable of making loans to prevent the failure of solvent banks, and could provide liquidity in sufficient quantities to prevent or end a financial panic • 3. deposit insurance • a depositor will receive the full account balance up to some maximum amount, even if a bank fails

TheGovernmentSafetyNetd4. FDIC and Bank Failurethepayoff methodpays off all the bank's depositors, then sells all thebank's assets in an attempt to recover the amountpaid outthe purchase and assumption methodFDIC finds a firm that is willing to take over thefailed bank.The FDiC sells the failed bank at anegative price.14-8

14-8 The Government Safety Net • 4. FDIC and Bank Failure • the payoff method • pays off all the bank’s depositors, then sells all the bank’s assets in an attempt to recover the amount paid out • the purchase and assumption method • FDIC finds a firm that is willing to take over the failed bank. The FDIC sells the failed bank at a negative price

TheGovernmentSafetyNetaFigure14.4Nominal and Inflation-Adjusted DepositInsurance Limits$ 25020015010050O19341944195419641974198419942004YearDepositInsuranceLimitDepositInsuranceLimit(Nominal)（in2004Dollars）14-9

14-9 The Government Safety Net

TheGovernmentSafetyNet福a5. Problems Created by the GovernmentSafety Net (1) bankers take on more risk than they wouldnormally, since they get the benefits while thegovernment assumesthecosts(2) government's too-big-to-fail policy limitsthe extent of the market discipline depositorscan impose onbanks14-10

14-10 The Government Safety Net • 5. Problems Created by the Government Safety Net • (1) bankers take on more risk than they would normally, since they get the benefits while the government assumes the costs • (2) government’s too-big-to-fail policy limits the extent of the market discipline depositors can impose on banks