《微观经济学》课程PPT教学课件（英文版）chapter 13 Game Theory and Competitive Strategy

Chapter 13 Game Theory and Competitive Strategy

Chapter 13 Game Theory and Competitive Strategy

Topics to be Discussed a Gaming and Strategic Decisions ■ Dominant strategies a The Nash Equilibrium Revisited a Repeated Games Chapter 13 Slide 2

Chapter 13 Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed ◼ Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ Dominant Strategies ◼ The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ◼ Repeated Games

Topics to be Discussed a Sequential Games a Threats, Commitments, and Credibility Entry Deterrence a Bargaining Strategy ■ Auctions Chapter 13 Slide 3

Chapter 13 Slide 3 Topics to be Discussed ◼ Sequential Games ◼ Threats, Commitments, and Credibility ◼ Entry Deterrence ◼ Bargaining Strategy ◼ Auctions

Gaming and Strategic Decisions a If l believe that my competitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits, how should take their behavior into account when making my own profit-maximizing decisions? Chapter 13 Slide 4

Chapter 13 Slide 4 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ “If I believe that my competitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits, how should I take their behavior into account when making my own profit-maximizing decisions?

Gaming and Strategic Decisions Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ● Cooperative Game Players negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies o EXample: Buyer and seller negotiating the rice of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (i.e. Microsoft and Apple) e Binding contracts are possible Chapter 13 Slide 5

Chapter 13 Slide 5 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ⚫ Cooperative Game ◆Players negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies ⚫ Example: Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (i.e. Microsoft and Apple) ⚫ Binding contracts are possible

Gaming and Strategic Decisions a Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ● Noncooperative Game .Negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possible o Example: Two competing firms assuming the others behavior determine independently, pricing and advertising strategy to gain market share o Binding contracts are not possible Chapter 13 Slide 6

Chapter 13 Slide 6 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ⚫ Noncooperative Game ◆Negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possible ⚫ Example: Two competing firms assuming the others behavior determine, independently, pricing and advertising strategy to gain market share ⚫ Binding contracts are not possible

Gaming and Strategic Decisions Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games . The strategy design is based on understanding your opponent's point of view, and(assuming you opponent is rational) deducing how he or she is likely to respond to your actions Chapter 13 Slide 7

Chapter 13 Slide 7 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games ⚫ “The strategy design is based on understanding your opponent’s point of view, and (assuming you opponent is rational) deducing how he or she is likely to respond to your actions

Gaming and Strategic Decisions An Example: How to buy a dollar bil 1) Auction a dollar bill 2) Highest bidder receives the dollar in return for the amount bid Chapter 13 Slide 8

Chapter 13 Slide 8 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ An Example: How to buy a dollar bill 1) Auction a dollar bill 2) Highest bidder receives the dollar in return for the amount bid

Gaming and Strategic Decisions ■ An Example 3Second highest bidder must pay the amount he or she bid 4) How much would you bid for a dollar? Chapter 13 Slide 9

Chapter 13 Slide 9 Gaming and Strategic Decisions ◼ An Example 3) Second highest bidder must pay the amount he or she bid 4) How much would you bid for a dollar?

Acquiring a Company ■ Scenario Company A: The Acquirer ● Company7: The Target o A will offer cash for all of ts shares ■ What price to offer? Chapter 13 Slide 10

Chapter 13 Slide 10 Acquiring a Company ◼ Scenario ⚫ Company A: The Acquirer ⚫ Company T: The Target ⚫ A will offer cash for all of T’s shares ◼ What price to offer?