云南财经大学（云南财贸学院）：《审计学》课程教学资源_案例十 欺诈的“长相”一一会计欺诈到底是怎样的?

案例十欺诈的“长相”一一会计欺诈到底是怎样的? 中华财会网(ww.e521.com)2002-05-14 accountantsworld作者: 当注册会计师所审计的的财务报表本身己经由于欺诈行为而被歪曲,注册会 计师或多或少要负点责任。 60年代的 Billy Sol用他并不存在的化肥槽做抵押来获得他永远也无法偿 还的贷款。他的做法很简单,注册会计师周一在 Amarillo稽核过的化肥槽连夜 运到 Lubbock,这样当注册会计师周二赶到 Lubbock的时候,化肥槽又被计算一 遍。诸如此类的小伎俩却让债券人受到数以百万计的损失。 注册会计师们为什么不在不同地区同时进行审计?原因也许是他们过于相信他 们的客户。可是注册会计师们又能相信谁呢? 还是在这个10年,四季护理中心将一批建筑合同的收入确认入帐,而该合 同根本从未动工。物料采购来并存放在施工地点,四周用篱笆围着。而AA的 注册会计师们认为没必要去施工现场,、他们仅仅依靠使用完工百分比法来计算 成本和收益。尽管这在技术上是合法的,但这夸大了收入,当这一事实被披露 时,该公司股价大跌。媒体宣称注册会计师被欺骗了,而注册会计师们却说他 们的做法无可厚非。 70年代,一位名叫 Deangelis的男士使用了类似 Billy的做法来欺骗注册 会计师,他利用管道把色拉油在不同地区的容器间移动,这样注册会计师便把 件资产多次计算。注册会计师们又一次被愚弄了。 他们为什么没有考虑到这些可能性并使用有效手段来保证正确稽核存货 呢?回答就是,注册会计师们那时不需要这么做。而当他们在另一些案例中发 现了类似问题时,他们却说那不过是与GAP有关的一个可笑的意外。 以上三个经典骗局有两个是注册会计师由于客户的欺诈行为而出具错误意 见。而“四季护理中心”的解体与安然丑闻类似。“四季”公司的会计对收入的 确认不符合逻辑,且就GAP而言过于牵强。对于此类欺骗,公众投资者实际 上是无法避免的。 安然事件让我们看到了对所谓“特殊目的实体”概念的滥用。其财务信息的 披露是显失逻辑且牵强的 这就是在不断变化的欺诈的表现形式。通常这些欺诈是通过利用诸如独立注

案例十 欺诈的“长相”－－会计欺诈到底是怎样的？ 中华财会网(www.e521.com) 2002-05-14 accountantsworld 作者： 当注册会计师所审计的的财务报表本身已经由于欺诈行为而被歪曲，注册会 计师或多或少要负点责任。 60 年代的 Billy Sol 用他并不存在的化肥槽做抵押来获得他永远也无法偿 还的贷款。他的做法很简单，注册会计师周一在 Amarillo 稽核过的化肥槽连夜 运到 Lubbock，这样当注册会计师周二赶到 Lubbock 的时候，化肥槽又被计算一 遍。诸如此类的小伎俩却让债券人受到数以百万计的损失。 注册会计师们为什么不在不同地区同时进行审计？原因也许是他们过于相信他 们的客户。可是注册会计师们又能相信谁呢？ 还是在这个 10 年，四季护理中心将一批建筑合同的收入确认入帐，而该合 同根本从未动工。物料采购来并存放在施工地点， 四周用篱笆围着。而 AA 的 注册会计师们认为没必要去施工现场，、他们仅仅依靠使用完工百分比法来计算 成本和收益。尽管这在技术上是合法的， 但这夸大了收入，当这一事实被披露 时， 该公司股价大跌。媒体宣称注册会计师被欺骗了，而注册会计师们却说他 们的做法无可厚非。 70 年代，一位名叫 Diangelis 的男士使用了类似 Billoy 的做法来欺骗注册 会计师，他利用管道把色拉油在不同地区的容器间移动，这样注册会计师便把一 件资产多次计算。注册会计师们又一次被愚弄了。 他们为什么没有考虑到这些可能性并使用有效手段来保证正确稽核存货 呢？回答就是， 注册会计师们那时不需要这么做。而当他们在另一些案例中发 现了类似问题时，他们却说那不过是与 GAAP 有关的一个可笑的意外。 以上三个经典骗局有两个是注册会计师由于客户的欺诈行为而出具错误意 见。而“四季护理中心”的解体与安然丑闻类似。“四季”公司的会计对收入的 确认不符合逻辑，且就 GAAP 而言过于牵强。 对于此类欺骗，公众投资者实际 上是无法避免的。 安然事件让我们看到了对所谓“特殊目的实体”概念的滥用。其财务信息的 披露是显失逻辑且牵强的。 这就是在不断变化的欺诈的表现形式。通常这些欺诈是通过利用诸如独立注

册会计师或政府代办(如调查员)来完成的。他们或者由于涉足咨询服务而使其 专业判断受到蒙蔽,或者由于政治压力而表现为执行无力。 有人说注册会计师通过帮助客户规避法令来获得收益而使公众利益受到了 侵害。这一说法在安然余震中并不鲜闻。但这是否就意味着行业自律已失效?决 不为了保证行业自律,必须不受政治因素的影响, 同时任何准则制定机构必须拥有一定数量的非CPA成员,他们通过制定明确 的披露规则,规范事务所从业人员的工作,又或是推行审计轮换制来保护公众利 益 注册会计师必须保持其客观和独立。一个有效的限制是要求审计人员在离开 事务所的一段时间内不得在其审计客户公司就职。 注册会计师行业必须迅速有效的应对安然丑闻,但更重要的是通过有效的管 理行业自律来恢复公众信心。(感谢视野网友 robbie编译) The Face of Fraud What Does Fraud Look Like? Auditors have always been held responsible, one way or anoth er, when a financial statement on which they have opined tu rns out to be distorted by fraud In the 1960s, Billy Sol Estes pledged fertilizer tanks he d idn't have as collateral for loans he couldn't repay. He fooled the auditors by moving the tanks at night to new lo cations so that the tanks the auditors counted on Monday in Amarillo were also counted on Tuesday in Lubbock, etc. Ill egal and deceitful clearly dishonest. Creditors lost millions. Why didn' t the auditors control all locations at the same time for comprehensive count? Hindsight, of cours e is 20-20. but reason may have been because they trus ted their client. Should auditors trust anybody? Later in that decade, Four Seasons Nursing Centers recognized earnings from construction contracts on which no work had been done. Materials had been purchased and stored on the

册会计师或政府代办（如调查员）来完成的。他们或者由于涉足咨询服务而使其 专业判断受到蒙蔽，或者由于政治压力而表现为执行无力。 有人说注册会计师通过帮助客户规避法令来获得收益而使公众利益受到了 侵害。这一说法在安然余震中并不鲜闻。但这是否就意味着行业自律已失效？决 不为了保证行业自律，必须不受政治因素的影响， 同时任何准则制定机构必须拥有一定数量的非 CPA 成员，他们通过制定明确 的披露规则，规范事务所从业人员的工作，又或是推行审计轮换制来保护公众利 益。 注册会计师必须保持其客观和独立。一个有效的限制是要求审计人员在离开 事务所的一段时间内不得在其审计客户公司就职。 注册会计师行业必须迅速有效的应对安然丑闻，但更重要的是通过有效的管 理行业自律来恢复公众信心。(感谢视野网友 robbie 编译) The Face of Fraud What Does Fraud Look Like? Auditors have always been held responsible, one way or anoth er, when a financial statement on which they have opined tu rns out to be distorted by fraud. In the 1960s, Billy Sol Estes pledged fertilizer tanks he d idn’t have as collateral for loans he couldn’t repay. He fooled the auditors by moving the tanks at night to new lo cations so that the tanks the auditors counted on Monday in Amarillo were also counted on Tuesday in Lubbock, etc. Ill egal and deceitful . . . clearly dishonest. Creditors lost millions. Why didn’t the auditors control all locations at the same time for a comprehensive count? Hindsight, of cours e is 20-20, but the reason may have been because they trus ted their client. Should auditors trust anybody? Later in that decade, Four Seasons Nursing Centers recognized earnings from construction contracts on which no work had been done. Materials had been purchased and stored on the j

ob sites, protected by chain link fence. Their auditors (Art hur Andersen, for what it's worth) saw no reason to visit job sites, relying instead on a mechanical calculation that recognized profit on the percentage of completion method by including costs of materials stored on the job sites in a cost-to cost calculation. Technically legal, but it overstat ed earnings and, when discovered, led to a precipitous decli ne in the stock price. Newspaper headlines vilified the aud tors for their gullibility. The auditors said there was noth ing wrong with applying the cost-to-cost me thod in a mechani cal fashion. Financial analysts( and a federal judge) said that was hogwash. In the 1970s, a Mr. DiAngelis fooled his auditors by moving salad oil from tank to tank through a complex web of pip es so that they "observed" the same oil several times. On ce again, Illegal and deceitful. clearly dishonest. Why didn't the auditors consider that possibility and design p rocedures to detect any attempt to mess with the inventory? The short answer is that auditors were not then required to design procedures to detect fraud. In those cases where they did discover something amiss, it was just a happy acci dent associated with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards so they said. Two of these three classic frauds involved deceiving the aud itors one did not. The Four seasons debacle is not that m uch different from Enron. In Four Seasons. the accountants a ccepted an earnings number based on an illogical and straine d interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principle The investing public is virtually defenseless against this ty pe of deceit. The evidence in Enron is clearly indicating s

ob sites, protected by chain link fence. Their auditors (Art hur Andersen, for what it’s worth) saw no reason to visit job sites, relying instead on a mechanical calculation that recognized profit on the percentage of completion method by including costs of materials stored on the job sites in a cost-to cost calculation. Technically legal, but it overstat ed earnings and, when discovered, led to a precipitous decli ne in the stock price. Newspaper headlines vilified the audi tors for their gullibility. The auditors said there was noth ing wrong with applying the cost-to-cost method in a mechani cal fashion. Financial analysts ( and a federal judge) said that was hogwash. In the 1970s, a Mr. DiAngelis fooled his auditors by moving salad oil from tank to tank through a complex web of pip es so that they “observed” the same oil several times. On ce again, Illegal and deceitful. . . clearly dishonest. Why didn’t the auditors consider that possibility and design p rocedures to detect any attempt to mess with the inventory? The short answer is that auditors were not then required to design procedures to detect fraud. In those cases where they did discover something amiss, it was just a happy acci dent associated with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards - - so they said. Two of these three classic frauds involved deceiving the aud itors; one did not. The Four Seasons debacle is not that m uch different from Enron. In Four Seasons, the accountants a ccepted an earnings number based on an illogical and straine d interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The investing public is virtually defenseless against this ty pe of deceit. The evidence in Enron is clearly indicating s

erious abuse of lled“ special purpose entities” arguably a strained and illogical application of disclosure r ules. This is the changing face of fraud. Fraud now is oft en accomplished co-opting the watchdog, whether an indepen dent auditor, whose judgment is clouded by profits from cons ulting engagements, or a government agency (think meat inspec tors) that can be rendered ineffective by political pressure. One might argue that when auditors can profit by helping th eir client skirt the rules, the public interest is not prot ected. We will hear a lot of that as one result of the e nron mess. Does that mean self-regulation does not work? Har dly! But self-regulation must be free from political influenc e and any standard setting body must have a majority of no n-CPA members dedicated to protecting the public interest by adopting clear disclosure rules, by prohibiting certain kind s of work by a company's auditors, and perhaps requiring auditor rotation. An auditor is much more likely t o retain objectivity, and avoid cronyism, if he or she know s that his work will be available to another firm within a year or two, and no amount of client pleasing rule twist ng can change the rotation. Another useful restriction would be to prohibit an auditor from accepting employment with a n audit client for a period of time after terminating emplo yment with the auditing firm. The CPa profession must respond quickly and effectively to d eal with the Enron scandal, but more importantly, to take c ontrol of the self-regulation process and restore public conf i dence

erious abuse of so called “special purpose entities” - - arguably a strained and illogical application of disclosure r ules. This is the changing face of fraud. Fraud now is oft en accomplished by co-opting the watchdog, whether an indepen dent auditor, whose judgment is clouded by profits from cons ulting engagements, or a government agency (think meat inspec tors) that can be rendered ineffective by political pressure. One might argue that when auditors can profit by helping th eir client skirt the rules, the public interest is not prot ected. We will hear a lot of that as one result of the E nron mess. Does that mean self-regulation does not work? Har dly! But self-regulation must be free from political influenc e and any standard setting body must have a majority of no n-CPA members dedicated to protecting the public interest by adopting clear disclosure rules, by prohibiting certain kind s of work by a company’s auditors, and – perhaps – by requiring auditor rotation. An auditor is much more likely t o retain objectivity, and avoid cronyism, if he or she know s that his work will be available to another firm within a year or two, and no amount of client pleasing rule twisti ng can change the rotation. Another useful restriction would be to prohibit an auditor from accepting employment with a n audit client for a period of time after terminating emplo yment with the auditing firm. The CPA profession must respond quickly and effectively to d eal with the Enron scandal, but more importantly, to take c ontrol of the self-regulation process and restore public conf idence

原文发表http://www.accountantsworld.com

原文发表:http://www.accountantsworld.com